But it is not enough merely to define virtue generically as a disposition; we must also say what species of disposition it is.
It must then be premised that all excellence has a twofold effect on the thing to which it belongs: it not only renders the thing itself good, but it also causes it to perform its function well. For example, the effect of excellence in the eye is that the eye is good and functions well; since having good eyes means having good sight. Similarly excellence in a horse makes it a good horse, and also good at galloping, at carrying its rider, and at facing the enemy.
If therefore this is true of all things, excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well.
We have already indicated Footnote 12.8 f. what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.
Now of everything that is continuous Footnote 2i.e., without distinct parts, and so (if divisible at all), divisible at any point, as opposed to what is διῃρημένον, discrete,
or made up of distinct parts and only divisible between them. and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and deficiency. Footnote 3Greek comparatives, larger
, smaller
, etc., may also mean too large
, too small
, etc.; and there is the same ambiguity in the words translated excess
and deficiency
. Again μέσον, middle
or mean
, is used as a synonym for μέτριον moderate
or of the right amount, and ἴσον equal
can mean equitable
. Hence to take an equal part with respect to the thing itself
means to take a part equal to the part left, viz. a half; to take an equal part relatively to us,
means to take what is a fair or suitable amount. The former is a mean as being exactly in the middle between all and none—if the thing in question is represented by a line, this is bisected at a point equidistant from its two ends; the latter is a mean in the sense of being the right amount for the recipient, and also of lying somewhere between any two other amounts that happen to be too much and too little for him.
By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody.
For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6;
since 6 —2 = 10 — 6, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. Footnote 4We should rather call this an arithmetical progression. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb. a small one: it does not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, Footnote 5A famous wrestler. but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken.
In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean that is not of the thing but relative to us.
If therefore the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean.
I refer to moral virtue, Footnote 6The formula of the mean does not apply to the intellectual virtues. for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly;
whereas to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.
And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in actions. Now feelings and actions are the objects with which virtue is concerned; and in feelings and actions excess and deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised, and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be successful are both marks of virtue.
Virtue, therefore is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the mean.
Again, error is multiform (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery, Footnote 7Cf. 1.6.7. and good of the limited), whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue:
Goodness is simple, badness manifold. Footnote 8The verse from an unknown source would come in better just before or just after the last parenthesis.
Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice Footnote 9Προαίρεσις, choice
or purpose
, is discussed in Bk. 3.2, where see note. of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, Footnote 10A variant reading gives determined by principle, or whatever we like to call that by which the prudent man would determine it
(vide Taylor, Aristotle, p. 77). as the prudent man would determine it.
And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.
Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states what it really is in essence virtue is the observance of the mean, in point of excellence and rightness it is an extreme. Footnote 11Cf. 4.3.8.
Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, Footnote 12See 7.15. The word means delight at another’s misfortune
, Schadenfreude. shamelessness, envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong.
One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and deficiency in acts of injustice or cowardice or profligacy, which would imply that one could have a medium amount of excess and of deficiency, an excessive amount of excess and a deficient amount of deficiency.
But just as there can be no excess or deficiency in temperance and justice because the mean is in a sense an extreme, Footnote 13See 6.17 above. so there can be no observance of the mean nor excess nor deficiency in the corresponding vicious acts mentioned above, but however they are committed, they are wrong; since, to put it in general terms, there is no such thing as observing a mean in excess or deficiency, nor as exceeding or falling short in the observance of a mean.