Section 6

In general one might wonder why we should seek for other entities apart from sensible things and the Intermediates: 1 e.g., for the Forms which we Platonists assume.

If it is for the reason that the objects of mathematics, while differing from the things in our world in another respect, resemble them in being a plurality of objects similar in form, so that their principles cannot be numerically determined (just as the principles of all language in this world of ours are determinate not in number but in kind—unless one takes such and such a particular syllable or sound, for the principles of these are determinate in number too—

and similarly with the Intermediates, for in their case too there is an infinity of objects similar in form), then if there is not another set of objects apart from sensible and mathematical objects, such as the Forms are said to be, there will be no substance which is one both in kind and in number, nor will the principles of things be determinate in number, but in kind only.

Thus if this is necessarily so, it is necessary for this reason to posit the Forms also. For even if their exponents do not articulate their theory properly, still this is what they are trying to express, and it must be that they maintain the Forms on the ground that each of them is a substance, and none of them exists by accident.

On the other hand, if we are to assume that the Forms exist, and that the first principles are one in number but not in kind, we have already stated 2 the impossible consequences which must follow. 3

(12.) Closely connected with these questions is the problem whether the elements exist potentially or in some other sense.

If in some other sense, there will be something else prior to the first principles. For the potentiality is prior to the actual cause, and the potential need not necessarily always become actual. On the other hand, if the elements exist potentially, it is possible for nothing to exist; for even that which does not yet exist is capable of existing. That which does not exist may come to be, but nothing which cannot exist comes to be. 4

(xi.) Besides the foregoing problems about the first principles we must also raise the question whether they are universal or such as we describe the particulars to be. For if they are universal, there will be no substances; for no common term denotes an individual thing, but a type; and substance is an individual thing.

But if the common predicate be hypostatized as an individual thing, Socrates will be several beings: himself, and Man, and Animal—that is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing.

These then are the consequences if the principles are universal. If on the other hand they are not universal but like particulars, they will not be knowable; for the knowledge of everything is universal. Hence there will have to be other universally predicated principles prior to the first principles, if there is to be any knowledge of them. 5