Since the term Being in its unqualified sense is used with several meanings, of which one is accidental Being, we must first consider Being in this sense. Footnote 1Sections 1-9 of this chapter correspond to Aristot. Met. 6.2-4. Clearly none of the traditional sciences concerns itself with the accidental; the science of building does not consider what will happen to the occupants of the house, e.g. whether they will find it unpleasant or the contrary to live in; nor does the science of weaving or of shoemaking or of confectionery.
Each of these sciences considers only what is proper to it, i.e. its particular end. As for the question whether the cultured
is also the lettered,
or the quibble Footnote 2This is a different form of the quibble
in Aristot. Met. 6.2.4. Here the fallacy obviously consists in the wrong application of the word ἅμα(at once
or at the same time
). that the man who is cultured, when he has become lettered, will be both at once although he was not before; but that which is but was not always so must have come to be; therefore he must have become at the same time cultured and lettered
—none of the recognized sciences considers this, except sophistry. This is the only science which concerns itself with the accidental, and hence Plato was not far wrong in saying Footnote 3Plat. Sop. 254a. that the sophist spends his time in the study of unreality. But that it is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental will be apparent if we try to see what the accidental really is.
Of some things we say that they are so always and of necessity (necessity having the sense not of compulsion, but that which we use in logical demonstration Footnote 4Cf. Aristot. Met. 6.2.6. ), and of others that they are so usually, but of others that they are so neither usually nor always and of necessity, but fortuitously. E.g., there might be a frost at midsummer, although this comes about neither always and of necessity nor usually; but it might happen sometimes.
The accidental, then, is that which comes about, but not always nor of necessity nor usually. Thus we have now stated what the accidental is; and it is obvious why there can be no science of such a thing, because every science has as its object that which is so always or usually, and the accidental falls under neither of these descriptions.
Clearly there can be no causes and principles of the accidental such as there are of that which is per se; otherwise everything would be of necessity. For if A is when B is, and B is when C is, and C is not fortuitously but of necessity, then that of which C was the cause will also be of necessity, and so on down to the last causatum , as it is called.
(But this was assumed to be accidental.) Therefore everything will be of necessity, and the element of chance, i.e. the possibility of a thing’s either happening or not, is entirely banished from the world of events. Even if we suppose the cause not to exist already but to be coming to be, the result will be the same; for everything will come to be of necessity.
The eclipse tomorrow will come about if A does, and A will if B does, and B if C does; and in this way if we keep on subtracting time from the finite time between now and to-morrow, we shall at some point arrive at the present existing condition. Therefore since this exists, everything subsequent to it will happen of necessity, and so everything happens of necessity.
As for what is
in the sense of what is true or what is accidental , the former depends upon a combination in thought, and is an affection of thought (hence we do not look for the principles of Being in this sense, but only for those of objective and separable Being) the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are indefinite and cannot be reduced to a system.
Teleology is found in events which come about in the course of nature or as a result of thought. Footnote 5This section is taken from Aristot. Physics 2.5, 6. It is chance
〈or luck
〉 when one of these comes about by accident; for a thing may be a cause, just as it may exist, either per se or accidentally. Chance is an accidental cause of normally purposive teleological events.
Hence chance and thought have the same sphere of action, for there is no purpose without thought. Causes from which chance results may come about are indeterminate; hence chance is inscrutable to human calculation, and is a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing.
It is good
or bad luck
when the result is good or bad, and good
or bad fortune
when the result is on a large scale.
Since nothing accidental is prior to that which is per se, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the cause of the universe, mind and nature are prior causes. Footnote 6The argument is stated more fully and clearly in Aristot. Physics 2.6ff.. Chance produces indirectly the effects produced directly by mind; and spontaneity is similarly related to nature. But the indirect cause presupposes the direct. The argument is directed against the Atomists. Cf. Aristot. Phys. 196a 24, Simplicius 327.24, Cicero De Nat. Deor. 1.66 (nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito
).