Section 65
"Now, what about the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body a hindrance or not, if one takes it along as a companion in the investigation? I mean something like this: do sight and hearing provide any truth to human beings? Or are not the poets forever harping on this theme, that we hear and see nothing accurately? And if these bodily senses are not accurate or clear, the others will hardly be, for they are all inferior to these. Do you not think so?" "Very much so," he said. "When, then, does the soul grasp the truth? For whenever it attempts to examine anything along with the body, it is clearly deceived by it." "True." "Is it not in reasoning, if anywhere, that any of the realities become manifest to the soul?" "Yes." "And the soul reasons best when none of these things trouble it—neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor any pleasure—but when it comes to be as much as possible by itself, bidding farewell to the body, and, with as little communion or contact with the body as possible, reaches out for reality." "That is so." "Therefore, does not the soul of the philosopher completely despise the body and flee from it, seeking to come to be by itself?" "It appears so." "What about these things, Simmias? Do we say there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not?" "We most certainly say so, by Zeus." "And the Beautiful, and the Good?" "Of course." "Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?" "Never," he said. "Have you grasped them with any other bodily sense? I am speaking of all such things, like magnitude, health, strength, and in a word, the essence of everything—what each thing actually is. Is the truest nature of these things contemplated through the body? Or is it rather this way: whoever among us prepares himself to think most fully and precisely about each object of his inquiry will come closest to knowing it?" "Certainly." "And he would do this most purely who approaches each object as much as possible with thought alone, neither dragging sight into his thought, nor dragging any other sense along with his reasoning. But using pure thought alone by itself, he attempts to hunt down each pure reality by itself, having freed himself as much as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the entire body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom when associated with it. Is this not the man, Simmias, if anyone, who will hit upon reality?" "You speak extraordinarily truly, Socrates," said Simmias.
Τμῆμα 65
ΦΑΙΔ.ἆρ᾽ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; φαίνεται. καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πότε οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; ναί. λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. ἔστι ταῦτα. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; φαίνεται. τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; πῶς δ’ οὔ; ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ’ ὅς. ἀλλ’ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.