Section 93
"Come then, by Zeus," he said. "It is said that one soul possesses intelligence and virtue and is good, while another possesses folly and wickedness and is bad. Are these things said truly?" "Truly indeed." "For those who posit that the soul is a harmony, what will they say these things in the soul—virtue and wickedness—are? Will they say they are another harmony and discord? That the good soul is harmonized, and being a harmony, has another harmony within it, while the bad soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?" "I cannot say," said Simmias, "but clearly someone adopting that hypothesis would say something like that." "But we have already agreed," he said, "that one soul is not more or less a soul than another. And this is an admission that one harmony is not more or less, nor more fully or less fully, a harmony than another. Is that so?" "Certainly." "And what is neither more nor less a harmony is neither more nor less harmonized. Is that true?" "It is." "Does that which is neither more nor less harmonized have a greater or lesser share of harmony, or an equal share?" "An equal share." "Then since no soul is more or less a soul than any other, it is neither more nor less harmonized." "That is so." "Being in this condition, it could not have a greater share of discord or harmony." "No." "Consequently, could one soul share in wickedness or virtue more than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue is harmony?" "It could not." "Or rather, Simmias, by right reasoning, no soul will have any share of wickedness, if it is a harmony. For a harmony, being entirely a harmony, could never share in discord." "Certainly not." "Nor, surely, could a soul, being entirely a soul, share in wickedness." "How could it, from what has been agreed?" "From this reasoning, then, the souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if indeed souls are naturally equally souls." "It seems so to me, Socrates," he said. "Does it seem to you," he asked, "that this is well argued, and that this would happen to our argument if the hypothesis that the soul is a harmony were correct?" "Not in the least," he said.
Τμῆμα 93
ΦΑΙΔ. δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ’ ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; συνέφη. οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕπεσθαι. συνεδόκει. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὑτῆς μέρεσιν. πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη ἁρμονία ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ; οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ’ ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον, ἥττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων; πάνυ γε. ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν; οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; ἀληθῶς μέντοι. τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὔσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην; οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ’ ὅτι τοιαῦτ’ ἄττ’ ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ’ ἧττον μηδ’ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; πάνυ γε. τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; ἔστιν. ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; τὸ ἴσον. οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ἧττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχή, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται; οὕτω. τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν; οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τοῦτο δ’ αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ’ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη; οὐδὲν πλέον.