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Section 76

"Because this appeared to be possible: upon perceiving something by sight or hearing or some other sense, one thinks of some other thing which he had forgotten, to which the perceived thing was related, whether dissimilar or similar. So, as I say, one of two things must be true: either we were all born knowing these things, and we all know them throughout life; or those who we say are learning later are simply recollecting, and learning would be recollection." "It is exactly so, Socrates." "Which do you choose, Simmias? Are we born knowing, or do we recollect later what we had acquired knowledge of earlier?" "I do not know what to choose at the moment, Socrates." "Well, what do you think about this? A man who knows should be able to give an account of what he knows, should he not?" "With great necessity, Socrates." "Do you think all men can give an account of these things we were just discussing?" "I wish they could," said Simmias. "But I fear much more that by this time tomorrow there will be no human being capable of doing so adequately." "So you do not think all men know these things, Simmias?" "By no means." "Then are they recollecting what they once learned?" "Necessarily." "When did our souls acquire the knowledge of these things? It cannot be since we were born as human beings." "No, indeed." "Then it was earlier." "Yes." "Therefore, Simmias, our souls existed even before they were in a human form, apart from bodies, and they possessed intelligence." "Unless we receive this knowledge at the very moment of birth, Socrates. That time still remains." "Very well, my comrade. But at what other time do we lose it? For we are not born possessing it, as we just agreed. Do we lose it at the exact same moment we receive it? Or can you mention some other time?" "No, Socrates, I did not realize I was talking nonsense." "Then this is how our situation stands, Simmias," he said. "If the things we are constantly talking about exist—a Beautiful, a Good, and every such reality itself—and if we refer all our sensory perceptions to this, discovering that it existed previously as ours, and we liken these sensory things to it, then just as surely as these things exist, so also must our soul have existed before we were born. But if these things do not exist, this argument would have been spoken in vain. Is this not so? Is there not an equal necessity that these things exist and that our souls existed before we were born, and if the one does not exist, neither does the other?" "It seems entirely clear to me, Socrates," said Simmias, "that the necessity is equal. The argument has taken refuge in the excellent position that our soul's existence before birth is tied to the existence of that reality you mention. For I find nothing so clearly true as this: that all such things—the Beautiful, the Good, and the others you just mentioned—most certainly exist. As far as I am concerned, the proof is adequate." "But what about Cebes?" said Socrates. "We must persuade Cebes as well."