Section 538
SOCRATES. For if it were the same knowledge of the same things, why would we call it one art here and another art there, when we could know the same things from either? For example, I know there are five fingers here, and you know the same thing about them. If I asked you whether we both know this by the same art—arithmetic—or by different ones, you would say the same art.
ION. Yes.
SOCRATES. Now answer what I was asking earlier. Does it seem to you that this applies to all arts: the same art necessitates knowing the same things, and a different art necessitates knowing different things? If it is a different art, it must necessarily know different things.
ION. Yes, Socrates, that is how it seems to me.
SOCRATES. Therefore, whoever does not possess a certain art will not be able to correctly recognize what is spoken or done well within that art.
ION. True.
SOCRATES. So in the verses you just recited about chariot driving, who will judge better whether Homer speaks well: you or a charioteer?
ION. A charioteer.
SOCRATES. Because you are a rhapsode, not a charioteer.
ION. Yes.
SOCRATES. And the art of a rhapsode is different from the art of a charioteer.
ION. Yes.
SOCRATES. If it is a different art, it possesses knowledge of different things.
ION. Yes.
SOCRATES. Consider what Homer says about medicine, when Hecamede gives a potion to wounded Machaon. He says something like: "Upon Pramnian wine she grated goat's cheese With a brazen grater, and an onion as a relish for the drink." Is it the doctor's art or the rhapsode's art that can judge correctly whether Homer speaks well here?
ION. The doctor's.
SOCRATES. And what about when Homer speaks of fishing? "As a leaden weight plunges to the bottom through the horn Of a field-dwelling ox, bringing doom to the ravenous fish." Is it the art of the fisherman or the rhapsode to judge if this is described correctly?
ION. Clearly, Socrates, it is the fisherman's art.
Τμῆμα 538
ΣΩ. ὃ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαί σε, νυνὶ εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, τῇ δʼ ἑτέρᾳ μὴ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἄλλη ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἕτερα γιγνώσκειν.
ΙΩΝ. οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα καλῶς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσται;
ΙΩΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐπῶν ὧν εἶπες, εἴτε καλῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, σὺ κάλλιον γνώσῃ ἢ ἡνίοχος;
ΙΩΝ. Ἡνίοχος.
ΣΩ. Ῥαψῳδὸς γάρ που εἶ ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡνίοχος.
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ ῥαψῳδικὴ τέχνη ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα ἑτέρα, περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστίν.
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγῃ ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι Ἑκαμήδη ἡ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν δίδωσι; καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως—
Hom. Il. 11.639-40 ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερον ἰατρικῆς ἐστι διαγνῶναι καλῶς ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς;
ΙΩΝ. Ἰατρικῆς.
ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὅταν λέγῃ Ὅμηρος—
Hom. Il. 24.80-82 ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἁλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρῖναι ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε καλῶς εἴτε μή;
ΙΩΝ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἁλιευτικῆς.
ΣΩ. σκέψαι δή, σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιό με· ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν Ὁμήρῳ εὑρίσκεις ἃ προσήκει ἑκάστῃ διακρίνειν, ἴθι μοι ἔξευρε καὶ τὰ τοῦ μάντεώς τε καὶ μαντικῆς, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ προσήκει αὐτῷ οἵῳ τʼ εἶναι διαγιγνώσκειν, εἴτε εὖ εἴτε κακῶς πεποίηται
— σκέψαι ὡς ῥᾳδίως τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐγώ σοι ἀποκρινοῦμαι. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ λέγει, οἷον καὶ ἃ ὁ τῶν Μελαμποδιδῶν λέγει μάντις πρὸς τοὺς μνηστῆρας, Θεοκλύμενος—