SOCRATES. For if it were the same knowledge of the same things, why would we call it one art here and another art there, when we could know the same things from either? For example, I know there are five fingers here, and you know the same thing about them. If I asked you whether we both know this by the same art—arithmetic—or by different ones, you would say the same art.

ION. Yes.

SOCRATES. Now answer what I was asking earlier. Does it seem to you that this applies to all arts: the same art necessitates knowing the same things, and a different art necessitates knowing different things? If it is a different art, it must necessarily know different things.

ION. Yes, Socrates, that is how it seems to me.

SOCRATES. Therefore, whoever does not possess a certain art will not be able to correctly recognize what is spoken or done well within that art.

ION. True.

SOCRATES. So in the verses you just recited about chariot driving, who will judge better whether Homer speaks well: you or a charioteer?

ION. A charioteer.

SOCRATES. Because you are a rhapsode, not a charioteer.

ION. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the art of a rhapsode is different from the art of a charioteer.

ION. Yes.

SOCRATES. If it is a different art, it possesses knowledge of different things.

ION. Yes.

SOCRATES. Consider what Homer says about medicine, when Hecamede gives a potion to wounded Machaon. He says something like: "Upon Pramnian wine she grated goat's cheese With a brazen grater, and an onion as a relish for the drink." Is it the doctor's art or the rhapsode's art that can judge correctly whether Homer speaks well here?

ION. The doctor's.

SOCRATES. And what about when Homer speaks of fishing? "As a leaden weight plunges to the bottom through the horn Of a field-dwelling ox, bringing doom to the ravenous fish." Is it the art of the fisherman or the rhapsode to judge if this is described correctly?

ION. Clearly, Socrates, it is the fisherman's art.