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Section 409

CLEITOPHON. But if we questioned the one exhorting us to these things: And what do you say these arts are? He would perhaps say that it is gymnastics and medicine. And now indeed what do we say the art upon the virtue of the soul is? Let it be said. He who seemed to be the most robust of them answering to these things said to me that this art is the very one you hear Socrates saying, he said, no other than justice. But when I said Do not tell me only the name, but thus. Medicine is said to be some art; and its results are twofold, the one to always produce other doctors besides those that are, and the other health; and of these the latter is no longer an art, but the work of the art teaching and being taught, which indeed we call health. And of carpentry in the same way a house and carpentry are the one a work, and the other a teaching. Let it be in the same way for justice that the one is to make just men, just as there each makes craftsmen; but the other, what is the work that the just man can do for us, what do we say this is? Tell me. This one, as I think, answered the advantageous, but another the necessary, another the helpful, and another the profitable. I indeed returned saying that Also there these names are in each of the arts, to do correctly, profitable things, helpful things and the other such things; but toward what all these things tend, each art will say its own thing, such as carpentry the well, the beautifully, the necessarily, so that the wooden vessels, it will say, are produced, which indeed are not an art. Let it be said indeed also of justice in the same way. Finally one of your comrades answered me, Socrates, who indeed seemed to speak most elegantly, that this is the peculiar work of justice, which belongs to none of the others, to make friendship in the cities. But this one again being questioned said that friendship is a good thing and never bad, but he did not accept the friendships of children and those of beasts, which we name with this name, to be friendships when questioned; for it happened to him that the majority of such were more harmful than good. Fleeing indeed such a thing he said that such are not even friendships, but those naming them thus name them falsely; and that the being and truly friendship is most clearly agreement. And being questioned about agreement whether he meant it to be a sameness of opinion or knowledge, he dishonored sameness of opinion; for many and harmful samenesses of opinion of men were forced to arise, but he had agreed that friendship is altogether good and a work of justice, so that he said agreement was the same thing and being knowledge, but not opinion.